Introduction
The Symposium, 1 for which this study was originally undertaken, had the ambitious goal of examining 'legal personality as a tool to benefit present society, future generations and humanity'. This is a critical developing theme in corporate governance. Only a few months after the Symposium, for example, Larry Fink, CEO of BlackRock, one of the world's largest institutional investors, declared that companies 'must benefit all of their stakeholders, including shareholders, employees, customers, and the communities in which they operate'.
2 This is not the first time that corporations have been urged to play a greater public role. In the early 1970s, a period in US history of great political upheaval and environmental concern, members of the Rockefeller Foundation's board of trustees stated that American corporations 'must assert an unprecedented order of leadership in helping to solve the social problems of our time'. 3 During the 1980s, however, this managerialist paradigm gave way to an essentially private conception of the business organization, which quickly became the dominant corporate law paradigm. 
The Rise of 'Corporate Culture' as a Regulatory Concept and Some Examples of Flawed Corporate Culture
Commentators have described the expression, 'corporate culture', as 'inherently slippery '. 10 This is partly because the concept, although frequently used, is rarely defined. 11 Even when it is defined, meanings vary significantly. 12 One useful definition is that adopted by the Australian Securities and Investments Commission ('ASIC'), which has described corporate culture as 'a shared set of values or assumptions which reflects the underlying mindset of an entity'. 13 Culture is also linked to the notion of collective corporate conscience; 14 and is often described as representing an organisation's DNA. 15 In spite of its definitional elusiveness, corporate culture has now become part of the regulatory dialect. Numerous international regulators, including ASIC, 16 statutory duty to 'promote the success of the company for the benefit of its members as a whole'. 32 The section states that, in so doing, they must consider the interests of a nonexhaustive list of stakeholders and the impact of corporate actions on the community and the environment. 33 This provision adopts an 'enlightened shareholder value' approach to corporate governance. 34 The 2018 UK Corporate Governance Code goes further in this regard, even though its provisions are non-binding, 35 . 60 In contrast, some other scandals, such as the sexual harassment incidents at Fox News and CBS, involved extremely high-level employees. In these cases, the problem was not perverse incentives; it was inadequate policing of the company's culture. It appears that the misconduct was tolerated when it was committed by senior employees, who were particularly valuable to the organization.
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The individual wrongdoers in these scandals were sometimes, but not always, identifiable.
For example, in the BP Oil Spill and the Commonwealth Bank of Australia anti-money laundering and counter-terrorism breaches, which involved complex computer systems and technology, it is far more difficult to pinpoint the responsible individuals. theory, corporate personhood is 'a matter of convenience rather than reality'. 70 In fact, it assumes that there is 'no such thing as a company'.
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The aggregate theory had clear implications for corporate responsibility and accountability.
Early treatment of the corporation as a persona ficta meant that corporations were incapable of mens rea, and therefore protected from liability for certain kinds of wrongdoing. 72 The theory posited that all legal wrongs are committed by 'flesh and blood' persons, 73 and the goal of the law should be to identify those individuals and bring them to justice. 74 The notion that only natural, and not juridical, persons can be subject to criminal liability still operates in parts of continental Europe, such as Germany, which continues to adopt the approach taken in the early English cases that 'a legal entity cannot be blameworthy'. 75 The second major theory of the corporation views it holistically, as a separate legal person ('entity theory'). 76 Legal personhood in this respect is a two-edged sword. It can be used to 136 Not surprisingly, this proposal provoked an extremely negative reaction in the business community, and has not been implemented. 137 However, another potential type of liability, which could apply to those overseeing companies with defective corporate cultures, is civil liability for breach of directors' duties.
To what extent can directors and corporate officers be liable for breach of their duty of oversight and care in failing to recognize, and address, ethical risks, which arise from a flawed culture and result in corporate wrongdoing? At least superficially, there is a major divergence between US, UK and Australian law in this regard.
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Under US state law, the most significant of which is Delaware law, directors face virtually no liability risk with respect to their duty of oversight, unless it can proved that they had actual knowledge of the wrongdoing. The Caremark case showed that a director will only be liable for 'bad faith' breaches of oversight responsibility, falling within the more stringent duty of loyalty. 144 The court stated that to establish lack of good faith, the plaintiff must show 'a sustained or systematic failure of the board to exercise oversight-such as an utter failure to attempt to assure a reasonable information and reporting system exists'. 145 Dicta in the Disney litigation and Stone v Ritter went even further, requiring, as a precondition to liability, intentional infliction of harm or conscious dereliction of duty by a director. 146 The practical effect of these decisions is to render the US duty of oversight aspirational only.
The narrow contours of the duty has led some commentators to question whether investors are, in fact, provided with any 'meaningful oversight protection'. 147 Although often justified on policy grounds, this legal regime has been challenged in recent times. One post-crisis UK regulatory development, which has sought to bypass this firewall and expand individual accountability in the banking area, is the adoption of a senior managers regime ('SMR'). 162 The goal of the regime is to provide a clearer roadmap of responsibilities within financial institutions, coupled with enhanced enforcement powers. 163 The Director of Enforcement and Oversight at the Financial Conduct Authority has stated that the regime helps to align the responsibilities of senior managers with the responsibilities owed by the firm 'to the whole community'. 164 This highly prescriptive UK regime 165 has provided the blueprint for an analogous regime in Australia, the Banking Executive Accountability Regime ('BEAR'), 166 and a similar regime has been proposed by the Central Bank of Ireland. 167 It is as yet too early to predict the effect of
In the area of directors' duties, although Australian law resembles US and UK law in a number of ways, it operates quite differently in practice. 168 187 accepted that breach of the statutory duty of care is not only a private, but also a public, wrong, and that there is a public interest in the enforcement of directors' duties in Australia. 188 Under this public enforcement regime, actions for breach of directors' duties are usually brought by ASIC, and the regulator has 'extraordinarily high success rate' in such actions. 189 An increasing number of ASIC's civil penalty applications involve so-called 'stepping stone' liability. 190 This developing form of liability involves a two-step process, whereby directors and officers may be personally liable for failure to prevent contraventions of the law by their corporation. 191 In recent stepping stone liability cases, ASIC has argued that directors breached their statutory duty of care by allowing the corporation to contravene another provision of the Corporations Act, thereby jeopardizing the corporation's interests by exposing it to a penalty. 192 Stepping stone liability is particularly well-suited to the kind of misconduct that often arises from flawed corporate cultures, and potentially increases the 
Conclusion
A number of recent corporate law scandals demonstrate that flawed corporate cultures can inflict damage on stakeholders, communities and society as a whole. The aim of this study is to explore, from a theoretical and comparative perspective, the issue of accountability for misconduct arising from defective corporate cultures.
The study examines two specific types of liability which may be relevant in the context of misconduct arising from flawed corporate cultures -(i) entity criminal liability and (ii) personal liability of directors and officers for breach of duty to their company. The study compares these forms of liability in the United States, the United Kingdom and Australia, to assess the extent to which they are well-suited to providing accountability for misconduct arising from flawed corporate cultures. As this comparative analysis shows, there are significant jurisdictional differences in these areas of law, which, in some cases, make these forms of liability ill-suited to achieve such accountability.
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